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Data Collection Techniques for 
Forensic Investigation in Cloud
Thankaraja Raja Sree and Somasundaram Mary Saira Bhanu
Abstract
Internet plays a vital role in providing various services to people all over the world. 
Its usage has been increasing tremendously over the years. In order to provide services 
efficiently at a low cost, cloud computing has emerged as one of the prominent tech-
nologies. It provides on-demand services to the users by allocating virtual instances 
and software services, thereby reducing customer’s operating cost. The availability of 
massive computation power and storage facilities at very low cost motivates a mali-
cious individual or an attacker to launch attacks from machines either from inside or 
outside the cloud. This causes high resource consumption and also results in pro-
longed unavailability of cloud services. This chapter surveys the systematic analysis 
of the forensic process, challenges in cloud forensics, and in particular the data collec-
tion techniques in the cloud environment. Data collection techniques play a major role 
to identify the source of attacks by acquiring evidence from various sources such as 
cloud storage (Google Drive, Dropbox, and Microsoft SkyDrive), cloud log analysis, 
Web browser, and through physical evidence acquisition process.
Keywords: distributed denial of service attacks, digital forensics, network forensics, 
web forensics, cloud forensics, mobile forensics
1. Introduction
In today’s world, users are highly dependent on the cyberspace to perform 
all day-to-day activities. With the widespread use of Internet technology, cloud 
computing plays a vital role by providing services to the users. Cloud computing 
services enable vendors (Amazon EC2, Google, etc.) to provide on-demand services 
(e.g., CPU, memory, network bandwidth, storage, applications, etc.) to the users by 
renting out physical machines at an hourly basis or by dynamically allocating vir-
tual machine (VM) instances and software services [1–3]. Cloud computing moves 
application software and databases to large data centers, where the outsourcing of 
sensitive data and services is not trustworthy. This poses various security threats 
and attacks in the cloud. For instance, the attackers use employee login informa-
tion to access the account remotely with the usage of cloud [4]. Besides attacking 
cloud infrastructure, adversaries can also use the cloud to launch an attack on other 
systems. For example, an adversary can rent hundreds of virtual machine (VM) 
instances to launch a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. A criminal can 
also keep secret files such as child pornography, terrorist documents, etc. in cloud 
storage to remain clean. To investigate such crimes involved in the cloud, investiga-
tors have to carry out forensic investigations in the cloud environment. This arises 
the need for cloud forensics, which is a subset of network forensics. Cloud forensics 
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is an application of scientific principles, practices, and methods to reorganize the 
events through identification, collection, preservation, examination, and reporting 
of digital evidence [5]. Evidence can reside anywhere in the cloud and it is more 
complex to identify the traces located in the cloud server.
The advancement of new technologies, frameworks, and tools enables the 
investigator to identify the evidence from trusted third parties, that is, cloud service 
provider (CSP). There are numerous techniques in cloud forensics that arises on the 
basis of cloud service models and deployment models. In the Software as a Service 
(SaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models, the customer does not have any 
control of the hardware and they need to depend on CSP for collecting the evi-
dence, whereas, in the case of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model, customers 
can acquire the virtual machine (VM) image and logs.
The forensic examiner isolates the attacked system in the virtualized environment by 
segregating and protecting the information from a hard disk, RAM images, log files, etc. 
This evidence is analyzed based on the artifacts of the attack traces left by the attacker 
[6, 7]. The forensic investigator relies on finding a series of information such as where, 
why, when, by whom, what, and how attack has happened. This chapter details the 
challenges in cloud forensics and also details the data collection techniques in the cloud.
2. Types of forensics
The forensic process is initiated after the crime occurs as a post-incident activity. 
It follows a set of predefined steps to identify the source of evidence. It is catego-
rized into five groups, namely digital forensics, network forensics, Web forensics, 
cloud forensics, and mobile forensics.
• Digital forensics: According to National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) standards, it is the application of science to the identification, collec-
tion, examination, and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the 
information and maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data.
• Network forensics: It identifies and analyzes the evidence from the network. It 
retrieves information on which network ports are used to access the information.
• Web forensics: It identifies the evidence from the user history, temporary log 
files, registry, chat logs, session log, cookies, etc. as digital crimes occur on the 
client side with the help of Web browser.
• Cloud forensics: It is the application of digital forensics in the cloud and 
it is a subset of network forensics. It is harder to identify evidence in cloud 
infrastructure since the data are located in different geographical areas. Some 
examples of evidence sources are system log, application log, user authentica-
tion log, database log, etc.
• Mobile forensics: It is the branch of digital forensics that identifies evidence 
from mobile devices. The evidence is collected from the mobile device as call 
history, SMS, or from the memory.
2.1 Cloud forensic process flow
The cloud forensic process flow is shown in Figure 1, which is described as 
follows:
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• Identification: The investigator identifies whether crime has occurred or not.
• Evidence collection: The investigator identifies the evidence from the three 
different sources of cloud service model (SaaS, IaaS, and PaaS) [8]. The SaaS 
model monitors the VM information of each user by accessing the log files such 
as application log, access log, error log, authentication log, transaction log, 
data volume, etc. The IaaS monitors the system level logs, hypervisor logs, raw 
virtual machine files, unencrypted RAM snapshots, firewalls, network pack-
ets, storage logs, backups, etc. The PaaS model identifies the evidence from an 
application-specific log and accessed through API, patch, operating system 
exceptions, malware software warnings, etc.
• Examination and analysis: The analyst inspects the collected evidence and 
merges, correlates, and assimilates data to produce a reasoned conclusion. 
The analyst examines the evidence from physical as well as logical files 
where they reside.
• Preservation: The information is protected from tampering. The chain of 
custody has been maintained to preserve the log files since the information is 
located in a different geographical area.
• Presentation and reporting: An investigator makes an organized report to 
state his findings about the case.
3. Evidence collection
Evidence collection plays a vital role to identify and access the data from vari-
ous sources in the cloud environment for forensic investigation. The evidence is 
no longer stored in a single physical host and their data are distributed across a 
different geographical area. So, if a crime occurs, it is very difficult to identify the 
evidence. The evidence is collected from various sources such as router, switches, 
server, hosts, VMs, browser artifacts, and through internal storage media such as 
hard disk, RAM images, physical memory, etc., which are under forensic investiga-
tion. Evidence is also collected through the analysis of log files, cloud storage data 
collection, Web browser artifacts, and physical memory analysis.
3.1 Cloud log analysis
Logging is considered as a security control which helps to identify the opera-
tional issues, incident violations, and fraudulent activities [9, 10]. Logging is mainly 
used to monitor the system and to investigate various kinds of malicious attacks. 
Cloud log analysis helps to identify the source of evidence generated from various 
Figure 1. 
Cloud forensic process flow.
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devices such as the router, switches, server, and VM instances and from other inter-
nal components, namely hard disk, RAM images, physical memory, log files etc., at 
different time intervals. The information about different types of attacks is stored 
in various log files such as application logs, system logs, security logs, setup logs, 
network logs, Web server logs, audit logs, VM logs, etc., which are given as follows:
• Application log is created by the developers through inserting events in the 
program. Application logs assist system administrators to know about the situ-
ation of an application running on the server.
• System log contains the information regarding date and time of the log creation, 
type of messages such as debug, error, etc., system-generated messages related 
to the occurrence, and processes that are affected by the occurrence of an 
event.
• Firewall log provides information related to source routed packets, rejected IP 
addresses, outbound activities from internal servers, and unsuccessful logins.
• Network log contains detailed information related to different events that 
happened on the network. The events include recording malicious traffic, 
packet drops, bandwidth delays, etc. The network administrator monitors and 
troubleshoots daily activities by analyzing network logs for different intrusion 
attempts.
• Web server log records entries related to the Web pages running on the Web 
server. The entries contain history for a page request, client IP address, date 
and time, HTTP code, and bytes served for the request.
• Audit log records unauthorized access to the system or network in a sequential 
order. It assists security administrators to analyze malicious activities at the 
time of attack. The information in audit log files includes source and destina-
tion addresses, user login information, and timestamp.
• VM log records information specific to instances running on the VM, such as 
startup configuration, operations, and the time VM instance finishes its execu-
tion. It also records the number of instances running on VM, the execution 
time of each application, and application migration to assist CSP in finding 
malicious activities that happen during the attack.
Due to the increase in usage of network or new release of software in the cloud, 
there is an increase in the number of vulnerabilities or attacks in the cloud and 
these attacks are reflected in various log files. Application layer attacks are reflected 
in various logs, namely access log, network log, authentication log, etc., and also 
reflected in the various log file traces stored on Apache server. These logs are used 
for forensic examination to detect the application layer attacks. Table 1 indicates the 
various attack information and the tools used for log analysis of different types of 
attacks. Figure 2 shows the sample access log trace (Table 2).
• Sample Network Log Entry
[**] [1:1407:9] SNMP trap udp [**] [Classification: Attempted Information 
Leak] [Priority: 2] 03/12–15:14:09.082119 192.168.1.167:1052 - > 172.30.128.27:162 
UDP TTL:118 TOS:0x0 ID:29101 IpLen:20 DgmLen:87.
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• Sample Firewall Log Entry
03/12/2015 8:14:07 AM,"Rule ““Block Windows File Sharing”“ blocked 
(192.168.1.54, netbios-ssn(139)).”,"Rule ““Block Windows File Sharing”“ blocked 
(192.168.1.54, netbios-ssn(139)). Inbound TCP connection. Local address,service 
is (KENT(172.30.128.27),netbios-ssn(139)). Remote address,service is 
(192.168.1.54,39922). Process name is ““System”“.”
03/12/2015 9:04:04 AM,Firewall configuration updated: 398 rules., Firewall 
configuration updated: 398 rules.
• Sample Syslog Entries
Mar 1 06:25:43 server1 sshd[23170]: Accepted publickey for server2 from 
172.30.128.115 port 21,011 ssh2.
Mar 1 07:16:42 server1 sshd[9326]: Accepted password for murugiah from 
10.20.30.108 port 1070 ssh2.
Mar 1 07:16:53 server1 sshd[22938]: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for 
ip10.165.nist.gov failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!
Mar 1 07:26:28 server1 sshd[22572]: Accepted public key for server2 from 
172.30.128.115 port 30,606 ssh2.
Mar 1 07:28:33 server1 su: BAD SU kkent to root on /dev/ttyp2.
Mar 1 07:28:41 server1 su: kkent to root on /dev/ttyp2.
Types of log Attacks Tools for log analysis
DMesg log This is not a log file, but this is used for 
determining anomalous activity from recent bots.
—
Debugging log Stack tracing to determine the nature of 
application and service-based attacks.
—
Firewall log Direct method for auditing the firewall. Event Log Analyzer, event 
logging and monitoring 
services
System log Determines if someone is trying or has executed 
buffer overflow.
Syslog-ng, Log & Event 
Manager
Network log Determining Web-based attacks and DDoS 
attacks.
Splunk, Log4j2
Web server access 
log
Determining Web-based attacks (XSS, XSRF, 
SQLI), remote file inclusion, local file inclusion 
and flooding attacks.
Nihuo Web Log Analyzer
Web server error 
log
Determining Web-based attacks. Nihuo Web Log Analyzer
VM log Determining hypervisor-related attacks. Virtual Machine Log 
Auditor, JVM controller
Authentication log Auditing of attacks on credentials and determines 
the unauthorized access.
Audit log Determining unauthorized user access to the 
system and network. Includes destination 
addresses, user login information, and timestamp.
WP Security Audit Log, 
auditpol.exe
Database log Determining database-related attacks. Splunk, Nihuo Web Log 
Analyzer
Table 1. 
Different types of logs, attacks, and the log analysis tool.
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Figure 2. 
Sample access log trace as evidence.
S. No. Fields Value Description
1 Remote Host 10.1.3.122 IP address of the HTTP user 
who makes HTTP resource 
request
2 Rfc931 — Identifier used to determine 
client
3 Username — User name or user id used for 
authentication
4 Date: time 
Timezone
[17-Mar-2015: 10: 49: 33 + 530] Date and timestamp of the 
HTTP request
5 HTTP 
request
GET/scripts/root.exe?/c+dir/HTTP/1.0 HTTP request containing
(a) HTTP method—GET
(b) HTTP request resource 
scripts/root.exe?/c+dir/ and
(c) HTTP protocol version 
−1.0
6 Status code 200 Status of HTTP request, i.e., 
success or failure
7 Bytes 578 Number of bytes of data 
transferred during the HTTP 
request
8 Referral URL https://www.nitt.edu/
OLCLD/view.php?q = book/
Referrer header of the HTTP 
request (containing URL 
of the page from which this 
request was initiated) if 
present, and “-” otherwise
9 User agent Mozilla/4.08 [en] (Win98; I; Nav) Browser Identification String
Table 2. 
Description of the access log format.
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3.2 Evidence collection from cloud storage
It is the process of collecting evidence from cloud storage such as Dropbox, 
Microsoft SkyDrive, Google drive, etc., using the Web browser and also by 
downloading files using existing software tools [11–13]. This helps to identify the 
illegal modification or access of cloud storage during the uploading or download-
ing of file contents in storage media and also checks whether the attacker alters 
the timestamp information in user’s accounts. The Virtual Forensic Computing 
(VFC) tool is used by forensic investigators to identify evidence from VM image 
file. The evidence is accessed for each account using the Web browser running in 
the cloud environment by recording the encoded value of VM image. The packets 
are captured using network packet tools, namely Wireshark, snappy, etc., of 
each VM instance running in hosts. The account information is synchronized 
and downloaded using client accessing software of each device which is used to 
identify the source of evidence. The evidence is isolated from the files found in 
VM using “C:\Users\[username]\ Dropbox\” for Dropbox as shown in Figure 3. 
The zip file contains the name of the folder that can be accessed via the browser 
to determine the effect of a timestamp in a drive. If an attacker modifies the 
contents of a file, the evidence is found by analyzing the VM hard drive, history 
of files stored in the cloud, and also from a cache. It can also be analyzed by 
computing the hash value of the VM image. The evidence of Google Drive cloud 
storage is depicted in Figure 4.
3.3 Evidence collection via a Web browser
The clients communicate with the server in the cloud environment with the 
help of a Web browser to do various tasks, namely checking email and news, 
online shopping, information retrieval, etc. [14–18]. Web browser history is a 
critical source of evidence. The evidence is found by analyzing the URLs in Web 
browser history, timeline analysis, user browsing behavior, and URL encoding, 
and is recovered from deleted information. Here is an example of Web browser 
URLs,
https://www.nitt.edu/en#files:/Documents/<Folder name>,
https://www.nitt.edu/en#files:/E:<Folder ID>.
Similarly, the evidence stored in Web browser cache at the root directory of a 
Web application is used to identify the source of an attack. Table 3 indicates the 
evidence collection process and recovery method for various Web browsers.
Figure 3. 
Dropbox evidence.
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Web 
browser
Information to 
be analyzed
Tools for forensic 
investigation
Recovery method for evidence 
identification
Internet 
Explorer
Index.dat
History
Cache
Cookies
Pasco
Web historian 6.13
Index.dat analyzer 
2.5
Net analysis 1.52
Encase 6.3
FTK 3.3
WEFA
Recovery from internet files
Analyzing the index.dat files weekly/daily 
history
Recovery of the evidence from index.dat 
file through carving method
Recovery from cookies
Google 
Chrome
Bookmark history
Bookmark 
downloads
Cookies
List of search 
words
Cache
Chrome analysis 1.0
Net analysis 1.52
Cache back 3.17
WEFA
Recovery of session file through carving 
method
Mozilla 
Firefox
History
Cookies history
Download list
Cache
Bookmarks
Firefox forensic 2.3
Net analysis 5.2
Cache back 3.17
Encase 6.3
FTK 3.3
WEFA
Recovery of cache files
Safari History
Cache
Cookies
Web historian 6.13
Net analysis 1.52
Cache back 3.17
Encase 6.3
FTK 3.3
WEFA
Recovery of session files, cookies
Opera History
Cache
Cookies
Bookmarks
Web historian 6.13
Net analysis 1.52
Cache back 3.17
Encase 6.3
WEFA
Recovery of cookies
Table 3. 
Evidence collection process and recovery method for different Web browsers.
Figure 4. 
Google Drive evidence.
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Here is an example of a Chrome forensic tool that captures and analyzes data 
stored in Google Web browser. It analyzes the data from the history, web logins, 
bookmarks, cookies, and archived history. It identifies the evidence from C:\Users\
USERNAME\Appdata\Local\Google chrome\UserData\Default. Figure 5 depicts the 
Google Chrome analysis forensic tool.
Figure 5. 
Chrome forensic analysis tool.
Forensic analysis 
framework
Evidence collection for cloud storage Evidence collection for cloud log 
analysis
Evidence 
identification
Identification of evidence from cloud 
storage (Dropbox, iCloud, SkyDrive and 
Google Drive, etc.) and also from user 
account information
Identification of evidence from 
cloud log files
Evidence collection Collecting the evidence from VM image 
to access the cloud storage account, using 
packet analysis tools such as Ethernet 
cap, Wireshark tool, Burp suite, etc. to 
capture packets between the client and 
server
Collecting evidence from VM browser 
such as Google Chrome, chromium 
browser, Internet Explorer, Apple Safari, 
Mozilla Firefox, etc.
Collecting the evidence from cloud 
storage namely, user account and 
password
Collecting the evidence from client 
software to access the VM hard drive 
and also to synchronize the user 
account to retrieve the files and folders 
in VMs
Collecting the evidence from 
various sources in VM as log files, 
namely network log, access log, 
authentication log, error log, 
database log, etc. and through 
network analysis tools such as 
Wireshark, Snort, Snappy tool, 
Burp Suite, etc.
Evidence analysis Identifying patterns from the evidence 
collection process to determine the 
source of attacks in cloud environment
Determining the attack 
patterns from cloud log 
files and analyzing these 
patterns using cloud traceback 
mechanism to identify the source 
of evidence.
Evidence presentation 
and reporting
Forensic investigator examines the 
evidence and presents the evidence in 
court
Identifying the evidence from 
analysis and reporting the 
evidence
Table 4. 
Evidence collection process for cloud forensics.
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3.4 Physical memory analysis
This has the ability to provide caches of cloud computing usage that can be lost 
without passive monitoring such as network socket information, encryption keys, 
and in-memory database. They are analyzed from the physical memory dump using 
the “pslist” function, which recovers the process name, process identifier, parent 
process identifiers, and process initiation time. The processes can be differentiated 
using the process names ©exe© on the Windows, and ©sync© on the Ubuntu and 
Mac OS. Table 4 indicates the evidence collection process for cloud forensics in 
cloud storage and cloud log analysis.
4. Cloud forensics challenges
This section elucidates the forensic challenges in private and public cloud. It is 
observed from the literature that most of the challenges are applicable to the public 
cloud while fewer challenges are applicable to the private cloud environment.
4.1 Accessibility of logs
Logs are generated in different layers of the cloud infrastructures [2–7]. System 
administrators require relevant logs to troubleshoot the system, developers need 
logs for fixing up the errors, and forensic investigators need relevant logs to 
investigate the case. With the help of an access control mechanism, the logs can be 
acquired from all the parties, that is, from a user, CSP, and forensic investigator.
4.2 Physical inaccessibility
The data are located in different geographical areas of the hardware device. It is 
difficult to access these physical access resources since the data reside in different 
CSPs and it is impossible to collect the evidence from the configured device. If an 
incident occurs, all the devices are acquired immediately in case of a private cloud 
environment since an organization has full control over the resources. The same 
methods cannot be used to access the data in case of a public cloud environment.
4.3 Volatility of data
Data stored in a VM instance in a cloud will be lost when the VM is turned off. This 
leads to the loss of important evidence such as syslog, network logs, registry entries, and 
temporary Internet files. It is important to preserve the snapshot of the VM instance to 
retrieve the logs from the terminated VMs. The attacker launches an attack and turns off 
the VM instance, hence these traces are unavailable for forensic investigation.
4.4 Identification of evidence at client side
The evidence is identified not only in the provider’s side but also the client side. 
The user can communicate with the other client through the Web browser. An 
attacker sends malicious programs with the help of a Web browser that communi-
cates with the third parties to access the services running in the cloud. This, in turn, 
leads to destroying all the evidence in the cloud. One way of collecting the evidence 
is from the cookies, user agent, etc., and it is difficult to obtain all the information 
since the client side VM instance is geographically located.
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4.5 Dependence of CSP trust
The consumers blindly depend on CSPs to acquire the logs for investigation. The 
problem arises when CSPs are not providing the valid information to the consumer 
that resides in their premises. CSPs sign an agreement with other CSPs to use their 
services, which in turn leads to loss of confidential data.
4.6 Multitenancy
In cloud infrastructures, multiple VMs share the same physical infrastructure, 
that is, the logs are distributed across various VMs. The investigator needs to show 
the logs to court by proving the malicious activities occurring from the different 
service providers. Moreover, it also preserves the privacy of other tenants.
4.7 Decentralization
In cloud infrastructures, the log information is located on different servers since 
it is geographically located. Multiple users’ log information may be collocated or 
spread across several layers and tiers in the cloud. The application log, network log, 
operating system log, and database log produce valuable information for a forensic 
investigation. The decentralized nature of the cloud brings the challenge for cloud 
synchronization.
4.8 Absence of standard format of logs
Logs are available in heterogeneous formats from different layers of a cloud 
at CSP. The logs provide information such as by whom, when, where, and why 
some incidents occurred. This is an important bottleneck to provide a generic 
solution for all CSPs and all types of logs. Table 5 indicates the survey of literature 
that deals with the challenges of cloud forensics mainly for evidence collection 
process.
Authors Discussion Forensic process
Sang et al. Log accessibility for SaaS & PaaS Evidence collection
Zawood et al. Focus on the integrity of log files Evidence collection
Dystra et al. Log collection and accessibility of logs Evidence collection
Thorpe et al. VM kernel logs for forensic investigation Log contention
Boeck et al. Confidentiality and log integrity Evidence collection
Zaferulla et al. Uses Eucalyptus logs for forensic investigation Evidence analysis
Marty et al. Collection of logs from different cloud 
components
Log retention
Sibiya et al. Uses data mining techniques to collect logs for 
forensic investigation
Evidence collection
Patrascu et al. Collection of specific logs Evidence collection
Nakahara et al. Evidence identification from different types of 
logs
Evidence collection and log 
retention
Table 5. 
Challenges of cloud forensics.
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5. Forensic tools
There are many tools to identify, collect, and analyze the forensic data for inves-
tigation. Juel et al. developed the PORs tool for the identification of online archives 
for providing integrity and privacy of files [19]. Dykstra et al. proposed a forensic 
tool for acquiring the cloud-based data in management plane [6]. It ensures trust 
in cloud infrastructures. Moreover, Encase and Access data FTK toolkit are used 
for the identification of trusted data to acquire the evidence. Similarly, tools such 
as evidence finder and F-response are used to find the evidence related to social 
networks. Dystra et al. proposed FROST, an open source OpenStack cloud tool for 
the identification of evidence from virtual disks, API logs, firewall logs, etc. [20].
6. Open research problems in cloud forensics
Many researchers have proposed various solutions to mitigate the challenges of 
cloud forensics. Some of the researchers have proposed new approaches to test the 
attacks in real-time environment. CSPs have not adopted the proposed solutions yet. 
Customers or investigators rely on CSPs to collect the necessary logs since they do not 
have direct physical access. Customers or investigators depend on CSP to collect the 
various information from the registry, hard disk, memory, log files etc. Even though 
various forensic acquisition process is proposed still the dependence of CSP remain 
unsolved. The critical issue is the usage of bandwidth resources. If the cloud storage 
is too high, then it results in more utilization of bandwidth. There is insufficient 
work evolved to preserve the chain of custody to secure provenance. There is no ideal 
solution for cyber crime scene reconstruction and preservation of evidence. Another 
critical issue is based on the modification of existing forensic tools that may lose evi-
dence. Some researchers have proposed logging as a service to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication [3]. This solution is not suitable for IaaS cloud.
7. Case study
This section introduces a hypothetical forensic case study related to a cloud stor-
age service and also describes a forensic investigation of the case.
7.1 Case study: cloud storage
The organization “X” found that their document named as “X_new.pdf” about 
the new release of a product has been leaked to their competitor [21–24]. “Mr. 
Morgan” was managing the credential files of the document stored in the cloud. At 
the initial stage of the investigation process, the suspect of the leaked file case was 
“Mr. Morgan.” The forensic investigator has to identify the suspect by checking the 
organization network, or by the analysis of log files, or by collecting the trace of 
relevant file in the network. Mr. Morgan’s network does not have any clue about the 
secrets since he uses only the personal computer (PC) and Android phone for busi-
ness. To identify the suspects, the forensic investigator seized the PC and Android 
phone since these are the target devices used by the adversary. From the suspected 
devices, the leaked file has not been detected. Later, the investigator started analyz-
ing the unallocated area in the file system, operating system, external devices such 
as hard drive, tablets, etc., and the Web service, but no evidence was found in the 
investigation. The investigator found that the Dropbox was installed in the PC and 
five files of config.db have been accessed recently. The forensic investigator issued 
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the search warrant and identified the evidence in Dropbox by accessing Morgan’s 
Dropbox storage with the username and password. It was observed that Morgan 
recently uploaded five files in Dropbox and identified that one of the files named as 
“XYZ_new.pdf” had the same contents as “X_new.pdf.” Later, he deleted the traces 
of uploading or downloading the contents in PCs. The investigator found that Mr. 
Morgan has deleted the traces of the file contents and shared the evidence stored as 
“XYZ_new.pdf” with the competitor through an external SD card.
7.2 Case study: online railway ticket fraud
An online railway ticket booking service provider claimed that some unknown 
user had used the internet ticket booking facility to book 44 railway tickets using 
the stolen credit card details [25]. It has been charged back from the credit card 
companies for all transactions which led to a huge loss to the service provider. It is 
inferred from the investigation that the suspects have booked 44 tickets with differ-
ent names of a person through the website at different locations. Later on, through 
investigation, the investigator found that the suspects arrived from a particular IP 
address, thereby seized the contents of the user accounts with the password, and 
the stolen credit cards were recovered from the suspects.
7.3 Case study: morphed photographs
The user got threatening pornographic emails from the adversary that one 
photograph was posted on the popular website [25]. The IP address for posting 
such threatening emails on the website was retrieved and was traced to a company. 
During an investigation, it was observed that the emails were sent from the com-
pany premises from one of the terminals. The log records and cookies were exam-
ined from the seized system and the morphed photographs were found in one of the 
systems used by the suspect. The mirror image of the hard disk was collected and 
analyzed using disk imaging and forensic analysis tools to recover all the data files 
required for the case. At the end of the investigation, it was found that the suspect 
was an ex-colleague of the company.
7.4 Case study: malicious insiders
Mr. X is an intruder who intends to exploit victims by sending malicious Web 
page in the cloud [26]. He uses a vulnerability to exploit the cloud presence of 
Buzz Coffee, a legitimate company. He installs a rootkit that injects a malicious 
payload into Web pages displayed and hides the malicious activity from the operat-
ing system. It redirects victims to the website, which infects them with malware. 
The users complain to the legitimate company that they are being infected, so the 
company went to the investigator to investigate the case by finding all the traces of 
the malicious Web page to identify the malicious user.
7.5 Case study: ransomware attack
A securities and brokerage firm became a victim of a ransomware attack [26]. 
The hacker demanded a ransom of two Bitcoins for each system that was infected. 
During the investigation process, it was observed that several other critical systems 
were infected with the same ransomware. Emails with malicious attachments 
appeared to be originating from a foreign location and were identified as the source 
of infection. The organization decided to take a proactive approach toward security 
with the focus on real-time monitoring to thwart such attacks in the future.
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8. Conclusion
Cloud computing offers on-demand services (CPU, memory, network band-
width, storage, applications, etc.) to users by allocating virtual instances and 
software services. Security is a major concern in the cloud wherein investigation 
of security attacks and crimes are very difficult. Due to the distributed nature of 
attacks and crimes in cloud, there is a need for efficient security mechanism. As 
cloud logs are spread across different virtual/physical machines (VM instances), 
switches, routers, etc., and also the customer (end user) is not aware of the 
activities of VM instances, cybercriminals exploit these sources to exhaust all the 
resources running in the cloud. Hence, evidence collection plays a crucial role to 
identify the suspects. However, collecting logs from the cloud infrastructure is 
extremely difficult because the investigator/security analyst has to depend on CSPs 
for collecting the logs and they have little control over the infrastructure. So, in 
order to identify the suspicious activity involved in the cloud, this chapter surveys 
the various forensic processes, evidence collection techniques for cloud forensics 
and the various challenges faced in cloud environment for forensic investigation.
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